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ABSTRACT

The role of the state is traditionally
considered to have been critical in
assisting
rapid
trade
union
membership growth in Australia in
the early 1900s and in the USA from
1935
to
1945,
through
the
introduction of the compulsoiy state
arbitration system in Australia and
the enforcement provisions of the US
‘Wagner’ Act respectively. However, a
closer examination of the evidence
indicates that neither was the
decisive factor in trade union growth,
although other forms of state
intervention sometimes were. We
conclude that the role of the state is
far more complex and problematical
than is often assumed in industrial
relations literature, and that it
warrants a greater focus in our
research agenda.

INTRODUCTION

The analysis of the role of the state in industrial relations
literature has been generally underdeveloped. Internationally, the
attention directed towards the nature, structure and motivation
of the state as an actor in the system has been limited. State
action has usually been treated as an independent variable, and
rarely as the phenomenon requiring explanation. In Australia, the
state has perhaps received more attention than overseas,
principally because of the central role of the arbitration system .
However, even there the role of the state as actor in the system
has largely been taken for granted, allowing for some variation
depending upon which political party forms government.
The consensus regarding the role of the state in relation to
trade union growth is a good example of these observations. The
role of the state is generally considered to be critical in assisting
rapid membership growth during the crucial 'take-off period' for
trade union movements earlier this century in Australia and the
United States of America. In Australia union density grew from
less than 10% in 1901 to 28% in 1911, and 35% in 1914, and
continued to grow to reach 51% in 1927. In the USA the unionised
proportion of the non-agricultural workforce grew from 13% in
1935 to 30% in 1945, after which it grew only slightly before
levelling out. These are remarkable growth rates in such a short
time span by any standards. The virtually unanimous consensus
of opinion in each country has directly attributed the union
growth phenomenon to specific legislation: in Australia this was
the introduction of compulsory state arbitration systems (federal
and State) from 1901, and in the USA it was the National Labor
Relations ('Wagner') Act of 1935. Each case is examined in
critical detail below, before drawing general conclusions regarding
the role of the state.
1

NORTH AMERICA

American employers have been notorious for their hostility to
unionism, which led to frequent violent confrontations in the first
thirty years of the twentieth century. Employers were commonly
supported by the courts which were usually willing to issue
injunctions against unions. Under these circumstances, unionism
was confined largely to the skilled blue collar workforce and
miners, despite the efforts of the Knights of Labour and the
Industrial Workers of the World to extend it further. Total union
membership density in the USA remained comparatively low at
about 10% of the non-agricultural paid workforce in 1929.
The labour policy associated with the 'Wagner model' is
credited with breaking through this impasse. The Wagner Act
contained two fundamental principles, which had been generally
accepted throughpout the Western world at that stage:
•

that workers had the right to choose an agent to
represent their employment interests free from
interference by their employer; and

•

that employers had a duty to recognise and negotiate
with unions freely chosen by their employees.
Neither of these principles was actually unique to the Wagner
model. They had been introduced in the USA during World War I,
and were reasffirmed in the 1926 Railway Labour Act, the 1932
Norris-Laguardia Act and the 1934 National Industry Recovery
Act (Millis & Brown 1950). They also became part of Canadian
policy in World War I, and were reiterated by most Canadian
provinces in legislation during 1937-8 ( Taylor & Whitney 1987;
Goldfield 1987; Cameron & Young 1960; Woods 1973; Coates
1973).
What distinguished the Wagner model from this earlier
legislation was the establishment of agencies with powers to
enforce the principles. The US National Labour Relations Board
2

(NLRB) had the ability to order employers to bargain in good
faith with agents representing the majority of relevant employees.
In order to exercise those powers, it developed a complex body of
procedural rules for determining bargaining units, bargaining
agents, indpendent unions and employee support. This unique
'administrative approach7 of the Wagner model was also adopted
in Canada in 1944 with P.C. 1003. The administrative approach,
rather than the adoption of the general principles themselves, is
traditionally credited with achieving the major impact in favour
of union growth. The Norris-Laguardia Act and the Canadian
'little Wagner Acts' of 1937-8 have been universally dismissed as
ineffective because they lacked enforcement mechanisms.
However, the evidence for the consensus argument is extremely
weak. Figure 1 indicates the trajectory of union membership
density in the USA and Canada from 1929 to 1955.
Concentrating first on the USA, it may be seen that, consistent
with the usual accounts, there was no major growth spurt
following the introduction of Norris-Laguardia in 1932. On the
other hand, there was no take-off in 1935/6 following the
introduction of the Wagner Act either. The first major US growth
spurt of the 1930s occurred in 1937, two years after the passage
of the Act. This delay is usually explained by reference to the fact
that the US Supreme Court found the Wagner Act to be
constitutional in that year (Brody 1990). Before that decision,
employers believed thsat the Act would be declared
unconstitutional (as was the National Industrial Recovery Act),
and thus, did not comply with it. This observation, in itself,
would seem to be evidence contrary to the eficacy of the
proceduresembedded in the Act - procedures which became
effective in 1935.
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Figure 1
Union Density in Canada and the US, 1929-55

Source: Bain & Price, Profiles of Union Growth, 1980

In fact, the capacity of the NLRB to compel an employer to
bargain was not very great. A number of historians have
illustrated the basic impotence of the Wagner Act procedures to
remedy an employer policy of determined resistance to employee
representation. Brody (1 9 9 0 , 146) noted in the Wilson case that
'clearly, "good faith" was not to be extracted from recalcitrant
employers by government fiat'. Millis and Brown (1950, 119-20)
generally concluded th a t:
If an em ployer w as in fact illegally refusing to bargain, and chose
to exercise his right to full hearing and to appeal to the courts for
review of a Board order, the final order that he must bargain
m ight come down from the circuit court or Supreme Court two or
three years from the time of the first violsation and the filing of
the charge. Only rarely would a local union have survived as a
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functioning organisation through this

long period.

[In such

circumstances} there was no penalty upon the em ployer, only th e
order to bargain upon request.

Employers also failed to generally honour the prohibition
against discrimination for union activity. Before the Supreme
Court validated the Act many companies openly favoured
company unions and openly discriminated against supporters of
'outside' unions (Wilcock 1961; Harris 1982). Even after the
validation, discrimination continued to be common. For example,
in 1937, 'in order to protect the men and their families from
intimidation and retaliation - particularly from the Pinkerton
detectives who, it was rumoured, had come to Washington to
locate these men and to gun them down', the NLRB 'smuggled
several Republic Steel employees into Washington to give
testimony' (Gross 1981,10). At Ford, the NLRB 'found "a rule of
terror and repression", with unionisation being suppressed by an
"utter ruthlessness" and by brutal assaults and beatings' (Gross
1981, 14).
Nor were the NLRB's powers of reinstatement as effective as
one might assume from the text of the Act. Prior to the TaftHartley revision in 1947, the NLRB issued orders reinstating over
800,000 workers dismissed for union activity (Millis & Brown
1950). Those figures mean that for every 35 new union members
at the end of the period at least one worker had been illegally
dismissed during the period. Almost certainly there were many
thousands more who were dismissed but filed no complainmt.
Moreover, orders of reinstatement, like orders to bargain, may be
resisted. Even if rehired employees may be harassed until they
leave voluntarily. Although the effectiveness of reinstatement
during the 1930s and 1940s was not the subject of careful
research at that time, there have been studies in later years. They
suggest that, although the technique has been relatively successful
where arbitrators reinstate employees into unionised companies,
5

NLRB reinsytatemnts, often back to companies where union
drives have not been successful, have not been very effective.
Only about 10% of workers reinstated after discriminatory
discharge in violation of the Wagner Act stay with the company
for at least a year (Weiler 1990, 86). These observations cast
doubt on the confident assertion that the Act 'freed workers from
the fear of employer discrimination' (Brody 1990,135).
By defying the Labor Board, Ford withheld general recognition
from the UAW until 1941. In that year the UAW won a
certification election at Ford's largest plant, River Rouge, but Ford
extended recognition to the UAW as the appropriate
representative of its employees at its other plants without
requiring the union to undertake the certicifation process. It did so
in part because the union had been able to successfully mount a
series of strikes at some of these plants, but even more
importantly because of direct intervention by the Roosevelt
government. Just before the general recognition the government
refused to grant Ford a major war contract because of its refusal
to respect US labour policy (Bernstein 1970).
Direct government pressure also played a very significant role
in the recognition of the United Steelworkers by several of the
'little steel' companies in 1942. In fact, it was common for
Roosevelt administration officials to become personally involved
in notable disputes and the President himself made it known ,
especially after the outbreak of World War 2, that he expected
employers to recognise and deal with unions. During the earlier
years of the his administration many employers resisted
government pressure in the hope that Roosevelt would be
defeated by a more business-friendly president. FDR, however,
was re-elected in 1936 (and again in 1940), prompting several
employers to extend voluntary recognition, in anticipation of
continuous pressure from government and unions. Even before the
Supreme Court decision General Motors recognised the UAW
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after a 44-day strike and the intervention of Roosevelt and the
Governor of michigan (Harris 1982). From 1936 until the passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 there was a growing conviction
among American employers that their continued opposition to
union recognition would bring mounting government intervention.
Taft-Hartley had the opposite effect. It gave unorganised
employers hope that government would permit them to pursue
labour exclusion within certain limits, the boundaries of which
they would continually test over the next several decades. Under
these circumstances, union growth levelled out from 1947.
In the Canadian case the pattern of union membership growth
for 1937-40 is consistent with the received wisdom that the 'little
Wagner Acts7 were ineffective. So apparently was the
introduction in 1939 of a clause in the Canadian Criminal code
making it illegal for an employer to discriminate against union
activism (Carrothers 1965). Union density declined in 1939-40.
Without the assistance of Wagner-like administrative procedures,
however, the Canadian unions grew at almost exactly the same
rate as the US movement between 1941-3. In 1943 British
Columbia and Ontario introduced Wagner-like legislation, but the
federal government's wartime labour policy, whilst supportive of
unions, depended largely on voluntarism (Woods 1973; Coates
1973; Stewart 1941; MacDowell 1978). Despite very respectable
growth figures, Canadian unions continued to complain
throughout the early 1940s about the ineffectiveness of the
wartime labour policy to address the refusal of particular
employers to bargain and negotiate in good faith (Coates 1973;
MacDowell 1978). Finally in 1944 the federal government,
pressured by union militancy and a strong electoral performance
by the social democratic Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
Party, agreed to import the Wagner model, in the form of P.C.
1003. However, there was no upsurge of unionism in 1944.
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Indeed, 1944-5 were relatively slow growth years in the 1940-7
period.
From 1947 Canadian and US density rates diverged.
Canadian unions continued to organise a larger percent of the
workforce each year until 1960 (Bain & Price 1980). In contrast,
US union growth flattened out after 1947, and after a slight
resurgence during the Korean War, it began a long decline. The
main difference between Canada and the USA between 1947 and
1955 was the absence of a legislative initiative in Canada with the
anti-union, anti-collective bargaining connotations of the TaftHartley Act.
It can be seen, therefore, that the administrative approach to
industrial relations that was introduced into North America with
the Wagner Act was not very important to the union growth that
occurred from the 1930s to 1950s in Canada and the USA.
Employees did not join unions in large numbers because they had
been made confident that they would be protected from
victimisation by their employers. Nor did the establishment of the
NLRBexert a determining effect on union recognition. Most of the
union-managementbargaining relationships that were established
during the period would very likely have occurred without a
labour board. In the USA the typical representation election was
a 'consent election' uncontested by the employer (Millis & Brown
1950). Contested elections became the notrm only after the
implementationof the Taft-Hartley Act (Friedman & Prosten
1993). In Canada collective bargaining expanded significantly
between 1935-44 without the aid of Wagner Act procedures, and
after tyhe implementation of the administrative approach there
was no significant change in the established trajectory of union
growth.
This does not mean that government policy was unimportant
to the expansion of unionism in this period. Not only legislation
but also direct government intervention helped to create a climate
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in which it was considered right for workers to be able to organise
free from employer interference and appropriate for employers to
recognise and bargain with employee representatives. TaftHartley in 1947 chilled that climate significantly even though the
technical changes to the National Labor Relations Act were
relatively minor with respect to union organising (Taylor &
Whitney 1987).
AUSTRALIA
The Australian compulsory arbitration system which developed
from the beginning of the twentieth century consisted of a dual
structure of national and State courts or tribunals. This occurred
because of the federal nature of government and the constitution
which limited national, or Commonwealth, industrial relations
jurisdiction to interstate disputes. As we shall see, the terms of
this consitutional power severely restricted the Commonwealth
jurisdiction. The first compulsory arbitration legislation was
enacted in Western Australia in 1900, but it did not become
effective until some time afterwards. The first effective legislation
was enacted in NSW in 1901. The Commonwealth Conciliation
and Arbitration Court was established by federal legislation of
1904. Other State courts or tribunals were not established until
some time afterwards; 1912 in the case of Queensland and South
Australia, and 1981 in Victoria. Beginning with Victoria in 1896,
States other than NSW and Western Australia adopted different
wages board systems, whereby standing boards composed of
equal numbers of employer and employee representatives, with a
neutral chairman, determined wages and working conditions
(Macintyre & Mitchell 1989).
Compulsory arbitration supposedly offered a number of
benefits to unions which registered under the various Acts,
including corporate identity, preference for union members, and a
9

monopoly of organisational coverage in designated industries.
Most importantly, unions preferred arbitration to the wages
board system adopted in most Australian States in the early
1900s, because it gave them a guaranteed role in industrial
relations. Wages boards did not generally operate through union
representation of employees. Arbitration, in contrast, seemed to
guarantee the existence of registered unions, because employees
could only be represented by a union in the case of a dispute, and
it is only necessary for one party to activate the arbitration
process by reference to a tribunal. This procedure effectively
obliged employer recognition of unions, which had been denied in
the great depression of the 1890s, when unions were decimated
by a series of major strikes over 'freedom of contract' and wages.
The impact of these strikes, the magnitude of which had never
been experienced before in Australia, provided much of the
momentum for the adoption of the compulsory arbitration system
in the early 1900s. The Labor Party was born out of these strikes,
to become the major exponent of state arbitration, and the public
concern created by the industrial turmoil of the 1890s provided
fertile ground for state intervention (Markey 1989; Macintyre
1989; Mitchell 1989).
However, the apparent advantages of arbitration were not
always apparent in practice. Corporate identitiy could be
obtained under the various Trade Union Acts of each State,
which followed the model of the 1871 British Act, beginning with
South Australia and NSW in 1876 and 1881 respectively. Yet, the
level of union registrations under these Acts was relatively low.
Preference to unionists in employment was not often granted in
the early years of the century, and not at all in the
Commonwealth sphere before 1910. Where preference was
granted, it was always qualified, 'all other things being equal',
and usually recognised a closed shop in practice (Wright 1983).
Nor was the organisational monopoly granted unions for specific
10

groups of workers a boost to the level of unionisation as a whole,
although it could be an important advantage for one union in
relation to others where there was competition for particular
groups by more than one organisation (Sheldon 1993.)
Australian trade union growth largely preceded the
establishment of an effective or extensive arbitration system. It is
worth noting that the initial take-off for Australian union growth
occurred in the 1880s, such that union density in the two most
populous and industrialised colonies (soon to be States), NSW
and Victoria, was about 21% in 1890, prior to the devastating
impact of the great 1890s depression (Markey 1988). This was
perhaps the highest density in the world at that time. Although
we lack precise statistics from the early period, it seems that
trade union growth also took off again in the early 1900s, even
prior to the impact of arbitration systems. We have noted that
most States in fact adopted wages board systems initially, and
did not adopt arbitration systems until after the first decade of
union growth, or later. Western Australia's arbitration system
also did not become effective until 1912. Its original 1900 Act
'was repealed within a year and re-enacted 'with amendments
which proved abortive'. The 1902 version prevented review of
Court awards until their expiry or withdrawl, and then, only if an
actual industrial dispute could be proved (Mitchell 1989; Ryan
1984, 33). As late as 1913, after passage of a more effective Act
in 1912, the total number of State awards under the Western
Australian system totalled only 18. The 1902 Act was more
supportive of industrial agreements, which totalled 82 in 1913,
(Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Labour &
Industrial Report No. 6, 79) but these relied on the prior existence
of unions and their acceptance by employers. The only State with
an effective arbitration system from almost the beginning of the
1900s decade was NSW, from 1902. Yet, trade union growth
occurred vigorously in all States in the early 1900s.
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A comparison of the rate of trade union growth in different
States for the first 12 years of the century is instructive. Tables 1
and 2 below reveal the full contrast between the different States.
A superficial glance suggests that compulsory arbitration did
have an impact on unionisation, since the two nominally
arbitration States initially demonstrated the greatest growth in
unions and unionsists. Plowman (1989), for example, emphasises
the difference between Victoria and the two arbitration States to
argue that arbitration explained the difference. However, the
statistics, such as they are, almost certainly distort the real
comparative state of unionism between the States. The table
suggests that there were only seven unions in Victoria in 1906, but
this is inconceivable. It is important to realise that 1912 was the
first year that the Commonwealth collected these statistics, based
on returns from trade unions, which were asked to provide
membership figures for the years prior to 1912 as well. However,
it seems that unions were unable to provide adequate statistics
for the earlier years, and Commonwealth Labour Reports were
forced to supplement union data with 'particulars published by
the State Registrars of Trade Unions' (Labour & Industrial Report
No. 2,13). Nor did the Commonwealth break its figures down on
a State basis prior to 1912, no doubt because of the lack of
accuracy. Hence, the only source for State union statistics prior to
1912 are the various State Yearbooks, but these do not
consistently provide figures in some cases (hence the gaps in the
tables), and the reliability is extremely questionable. The
Commonwealth estimates for total union membership in the years
1906, 1908-10 are considerablely higher than the total from all
State sources for those years (provided in brackets in the Table).
The point is that the statistics prior to 1912 are based on reports
from the Registrar of Trade Unions or Industrial Registrar in each
State, based upon the number of unions registered in that State.
However, only NSW and Western Australia had arbitration
12

systems which registered unions. The other States did not register
unions under their wages board systems. Unions in these States
only registered under the Commonwealth system, which had
limited coverage, or under the various Trade Union Acts, and in
fact few unions took the latter option. Hence, the nature of the
statistics themselves inevitably underestimate the extent of
unionism in non-arbitration States.
The tables also show that the number of unions and unionists
grew dramatically between 1910 and 1912, including for the non
arbitration States. This undoubtedly exaggerates the real growth
in all States at that time, because it underestimates the level of
unionisation prior to 1912, particularly for non-arbitration States.
For example, once again, it is inconceivable that the number of
Victorian unions grew from three to 151 in the space of two years.
The greater accuracy in recording which is indicated with the
increases for non-arbitration States in 1912 may be explained by
a combination of the beginnings of systematic Commonwealth
data collection in that year, the adoption of arbitration systems in
all non-arbitration States except Victoria in 1911-12, and the
registration of Victorian unions under the federal Act. The
increases in 1912 for number of unions and unionists in South
Australia, Queensland and Tasmania reflected the fact that
unions could register under State arbitration systems for the first
time, and appear to have been keen to take that opportunity. But
the arbitration legislation in those States was too recent for it to
have provided substantial assistance to union growth at that
time, if it ever did. This leaves Victoria, which did not adopt an
arbitral approach until 1981. Its union growth at this time,
according to the statistics, was entirely due to registration under
the federal Act. It is notable in this regard that agreements
certified by the Commonwealth Court increased from 129 to 229
in Victoria between 1913 and 1915, but declined in every other
State (Labour & Industrial Report No. 6, 79). However, as
13

agreements ratified by the Commonwealth Court, these did not
indicate the role of arbitration in union growth, for they relied on
employer recognition and willingness to bargain with unions.

Table 1
Trade Unions in Australia, by State, 1906-20
Year

NSW

Vic.

Qld

SA

WA

Tas.

1906

134

7

19

23

Aust.

82

1

266

1908

150

5

32

27

116

1

331

1909

166

5

33

25

122

0

351

1910

171

3

37

24

130

0

365

1912

177

151

67

78

97

51

408

1913

201

162

94

86

107

60

432

1914

197

170

86

87

107

62

430

1915

203

161

89

87

104

66

415

1916

199

151

93

86

107

66

392

1917

220

156

96

93

108

71

389

1918

217

158

102

101

111

74

394

1919

211

160

106

101

112

77

394

1920

214

158

115

104

121

81

388
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Table 2
Trade Unionists in Australia by State, 1906-20
Y ear

N SW

V ic.

Q ld

SA

WA

T as.

A u st.

1906

87,435

8,820

8,332

5,106

12,031

53

175,529
(130,109)

1908

112,477

7,464

14,980

2,930

15,088

59

240,475
(152,998)

1909

127,402

8,096

16,423

1910

129,544

(130,806)

18,522

1,692

17,282

0

273,461
(170,895)

2,818

20,429

0

302,119
(171,313)

116,557

1912

192,626

1913

230,677

44,768

130,176

51,683

1914

240,023

138,810

55,580

1915

241,979

141,993

58,310

37,336

33,282

8,655

40,061

35,317

10,011

497,925

40,956

38,106

9,149

523,271

39,264

35,980

9,346

528,031

433,224

1916

244,074

147,614

66,807

42,537

33,900

10,263

546,556

1917

248,851

148,730

75,393

45,400

33,263

10,886

564,187

1918

243,176

152,063

87,737

51,559

33,761

11,900

581,755

1919

255,899

164,583

97,378

56,879

38,556

13,556

627,865

277,519

187,100

103,784

55,958

44,054

15,220

684,450

1920

Sources: various State Yearbooks, and Commonwealth Bureau of Census and
Statistics, Labour and Industrial Branch Report

No. 2, Trade

Unionism,

Unemployment, Wages, Prices and Cost of Living in Australia, 1891-1912, April
1913.
N.B.' Aust.' column includes a small number of unions for the Northern Territory
after 1913.
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Finally, although all States indicate a marked increase in
unionisation from 1912 to 1913, this increase is especially marked
for NSW. It is unlikely that the arbitration system can be held
responsible for this sharp rise, because it had been operating for
over ten years by then. Two other factors may have been
responsible. One was an amendment to the NSW Act in 1912,
which restored the central role for unions in reference of disputes,
after the 1908 Act had created wages boards within the
arbitration framework, to which reference of disputes by
employees need not originate from unions. However, whilst the
unions strongly opposed the 1908 measure, it is unlikely to have
effected the level of unionisation. The second factor which seems
to have had a greater impact is the effect of a Labor government
from 1910, which strongly supported unionisation in the public
sector over which it had control. No other State enjoyed a labor
government at this time.
The coverage of the federal arbitration system was also very
limited in its first decade of operation after 1904. One indication
of this may be gained from a simple examination of the volume of
activity recorded. As late as 1909, when the Commonwealth
Court's scope was essentially restricted to the maritime and
pastoral industries, only seven cases came before it. Of these,
employers obtained writs of prohibition in three cases, and two
cases involving rival unions' applications for the others'
deregistration were dismissed. Only two agreements were
certified, and the total year's business occupied 100 pages of the
Commonwealth Arbitration Reports. This low level of activity did
not increase until after 1913, such that in 1916 'as many awards
were made as had previously existed' (Plowman 1989, 152)
Because of the constitutional limitation of the Commonwealth
Court's jurisdiction to interstate disputes, it was really only
national or interstate unions which could seek federal awards,
and most unions at the beginning of the century were State-based
16

organisations. National unions developed quite quickly, to total
72 in 1912, and 95 in 1919, accounting for over 80% of unionists,
(Commonwealth Labour Reports, Nos. 9, 13; Markey 1994, 77),
partly to take advantage of favourable decisions in the
Commonwealth Court under the head of Justice Higgins, notably
his 1907 harvester Judgment which established a basic wage.
However, most of these organisations were really federations of
State-based unions which conducted most union business and
have remained the primary locus of union power ever since then.
The State branches of these new interstate unions have usually
remained registered under State arbitration systems, and as late
as 1914 there were only 16 federal awards, compared with 242 in
NSW. Even in 1920, after the considerable growth in federal
arbitral activity, the Commonwealth Court was only responsible
for 71 awards and 220 certified agreements, compared with the
359 awards and 107 agreements of the NSW Court, and in the
next five years the number of Commonwealth awards and
agreements actually declined dramatically, before continuing to
grow again (Commonwealth Labour Report No. 14).
Even in NSW, however, much of the union growth which
occurred in the early 1900s, did so initially outside the protection
of the Arbitration Court. It took time for the new system to
develop its own rules and procedures, and to extend to a
significant proportion of the workforce on a case by case basis.
As unions rapidly re-formed from 1900 and sought registration
and awards of the court, a back-log of cases quickly developed.
The Court was served initially by only one judge. Many of the
early applications involved lengthy test cases, in which it was
important to have legal representation,and the more legality
involved, the more complexity and delay in proceedings. The
situation was exacerbated in 1905, when the government took
three months to replace the first judge of the court, and it simply
ground to a halt for that time. Late in 1905 a deputy president of
17

the court was appointed to assist the new chief judge, but delays
in proceedings remained a recurring complaint by unions over the
whole period 1904-08. (Markey 1994, 134-5) Nevertheless, this
period was one of tremendous trade union growth. As early as
1906, there were 129 unions covering 88,000 workers registered
with the NSW court, but it does not seem that these workers were
covered by awards very quickly after registration of their unions.
For all of these reasons, therefore, we must conclude that much,
even most, of the trade union growth which occurred on a
national level before 1914, and some even afterwards, occurred
outside the umbrella of compulsory state arbitration, even though,
subsequently these unions registered under the various arbitration
systems.
As in America, Australian employer resistance to the
legislation through litigation and other means, considerably
reduced its effectiveness in the short to medium term. In Australia
opposition to arbitration was the main rallying point for the
formation of the Employers' Federation of NSW in 1903 (after the
previous Employers' Union became defunct in 1894), and the
Central Council of Employers of Australia (CCEA) the following
year. After failing in their lobbying attempts to prevent its
enactment, the employers did their best to make the NSW Act
inoperative. They threatened relocation in other States, and
circumvented awards by installation of new technology and
machinery, replacement of male with cheaper female labour, and
by the introduction of sub-contracting. They formed and
registered bogus unions, including a Tramway Temployees' Union,
rival seamen's and agricultural implement makers' unions, a NonPolitical Union in Broken Hill, an Independent Workers'
Federation, and a Machine Shearers' Union, all in competition
with existing organisations (Plowman 1989). The last-named
succeeded in forcing the largest Australian union of the time, the
Australian Workers' Union (AWU, a general union, originally
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with a rural workers' base) outside the State arbitration system
and into the federal one.
Employers in NSW also deliberately lengthened procedures
with delaying tactics and numerous appeals to the State Supreme
Court and the High Court of Australia in the early 1900s. These
efforts were particularly effective because of the experimental
nature of the original legislation. For example, the coverage of
awards of the Court was restricted to the workers immediately
involved in a dispute by disallowing the establishment of
'common rules' covering all employees in an industry or
occupation. This greatly circumscribed the Court's ability to co
ordinate industrial relations in any one industry, and
considerably lengthened its proceedings 'because the president
could not investigate one concern and apply his decisions to all
concerns of a like character, but had to examine each firms's case
separately'. (Plowman 1989, 150 speaking of the federal scene)
Proceedings were made more expensive and difficult for unions,
and non-unionists were placed beyond the jurisdiction of the
Court, thus allowing employers to prefer employment of them to
unionists who were covered by an award. The existence of an
actual dispute was also deemed necessary in order for the
Arbitration Court to have jurisdiction; and a union could not act
as an agent for employees until a dispute existed, thereby denying
employees the protection of their union during initial negotiations
for an award (Ryan 1984; Markey 1989, 172). This meant that,
far from gaining the support of the system in order to face
employers, unions needed to already possess sufficient strength
to undertake industrial action in order to participate in the
arbitration system.
Even if employer-initiated appeals to the Supreme or High
Courts were unsuccessful, they still delayed proceedings, and
together with the use of legal counsel, greatly added to their
expense. In its first year of operation in 1902, the NSW Court
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disposed of only eleven out of 81 cases. Subsequently, 'congestion
became progressively. By 1905, despite the determination of 25
awards covering 10,000 workers, the NSW Court was 'in a state
of collapse' because of appeals and the delays they caused, such
that there was a two-year wait for an appearance worse' (Ryan
1984, 30-2, 74; Markey 1994, 134-5). Under these circumstances,
it is clear that even in NSW, the rapid growth of unions at this
time could not have been dependent upon gaining recognition
through a favourable award.
As the situation in NSW deteriorated from the unions' point of
view, the Commonwealth Court seemed to offer better prospects,
particularly because of the 1907 Harvester Judgment, but
employer appeals also clogged up the Commonwealth Court and
succeeded in constraining its effectiveness. The CCEA established
a $10,000 fund specifically for this purpose, and enjoyed
considerable success in a series of appeals to 1913, because the
balance of opinion on the High Court favoured a minimal role for
the federal arbitration system. The High Court removed State
government employees from federal jurisdiction in 1906, and in
1909 declared that any matter regulated by State law could not
be included under federal jurisdiction. The latter decision meant
that the federal arbitration system was effectively excluded from
wages boards States, or at least from those major industries
which had wages. The High Court also proved receptive to
employer arguments for a narrow literal interpretation of the key
constitutional terms enabling Commonwealth arbitration. Hence,
it also disallowed the determination of common rules for the
federal Court, with the same effect as this limitation in NSW. In
1910 in the first of three Bootmakers'Cases, the High Court ruled
that the Commonwealth Arbitration Court could not make
awards inconsistent with State awards applying to the parties to
a dispute. Employers were less successful in the second
Bootmakers' Case, where they sought a declaration that the
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compulsory nature of federal awards was unconstitutional.
However, in the third Bootmakers' Case and the Sawmillers'
Case, the High Court ruled that disputes must be 'real and
genuine and not fictitious and illusory', for the purpose of
activating federal Court jurisdiction under the terms of the
constitutional powers given the Commonwealth. As with a similar
decision for NSW, this rejected the concept of a 'paper dispute'
for this purpose. The High Court also declared in another case
that disputes could not exist over matters already the subject of
an agreement between the parties (Plowman 1989). In a number of
cases the High Court set aside determinations of the Arbitration
Court on the grounds that they were not proper interstate
disputes.
In the longer term, the degree of favourableness of the NSW
and Commonwealth systems for unions was improved. The NSW
system was gradually improved by Labor governments from
1912, to allow common rules and paper disputes. Federally, the
improvements were less significant, largely because of the
constitutional constraints. The national Labor government failed
to overcome many of the limitations described above by referenda
to amend the constitution in 1911 and 1913, when it lost
government briefly. However, by then it had appointed judges to
the High Court who were more favourable to extending the
Commonwealth Court's jurisdiction. In 1914 the High Court
accepted 'paper' disputes, and began to interpret the concept of
an interstate dispute more broadly. However, a number of
restrictions remained long afterwards, including the Court's
inability to award common rules, and the exclusion from its
jurisdiction of most professional and semi-professional white
collar workers by a narrow interpretation of what constituted
'industrial' in an industrial dispute. Most importantly, during the
actual take-off period of union growth in the first decade and a
half of the century, the restrictions imposed upon the
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Commonwealth Court by the High Court's interpretation of its
constitutional jurisdiction prevented it from effectively asssisting
union organisation.
CONCLUSIONS
The consensus regarding the role of the state in relation to trade
union growth is a good example of the underdevelopment of its
analysis in industrial relations and labour history. An
examination of the evidence relating to the form of state
intervention described here, the administrative approach (i.e. the
Australian compulsory arbitration system and the enforcement
provisions of the American Wagner Act), reveals that it was not
in itself the critical factor in trade union growth, in Australia or
America. In both cases, the timing of union growth surges and the
impact of the legislation failed to fully coincide, and employer
resistance to the legislation through litigation and other means,
considerably reduced its effectiveness in the short to medium
term. In the long term, the degree of favourableness of the systems
for unions was considerably reduced, in Australia by the High
Court and State Supreme Courts, and in America by the post-war
Taft-Hartley Act. Furthermore, union growth was just as vigorous
in Australian States without arbitration systems as those with. In
the USA government policy during the Second World War seems
to have been more decisive in encouraging unionisation than the
Wagner Act per se, and in Australia Labor governments'
encouragement of unionism also seems to have been critical.
Canada offers a telling contrast to the USA, because it failed to
adopt the enforcement provisions of the Wagner Act until 1944.
Yet, Canadian union growth 'took off' in a similar pattern to the
USA prior to 1944, after which it did not appear to be positively
affected by the new provisions.
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These observations do not deny the importance of the role of
the state in industrial relations. However, they do challenge the
accepted interpretations of that role in the cases analysed here.
We conclude that the role of the state is far more complex and
problematical than is often assumed in industrial relations
literature, and that it warrants a greater focus in our research
agenda.
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